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1. Introduction 
 
Modern approaches to forest biodiversity conservation rely on the management of 
forests as a connected network consisting of different types of forests and stands. 
Entirely preserved forest areas are core of the biodiversity conservation network. 
Around this core should be built a pattern of buffer zone forests, commercial forests 
with restricted management and regular commercial forests in which biodiversity 
conservation is actively taken into account. All parts of the network are linked to each 
other so as to ensure the interconnection and continuum of forest landscapes (for the 
literature, see e.g. Franklin 1993, Franklin and Forman 1987, Lindenmayer and 
Franklin 2002, Hunter 1999, and Swallow et al. 1997). 
 
Biodiversity maintenance in commercial boreal forests implies lengthening rotation 
ages, promoting tree species diversity and creating new structural elements, such as the 
volumes of dead and decaying wood (Hunter 1999). The role of tree species diversity 
and the structural elements is to increase habitats and sustain species diversity. In 
Nordic countries and elsewhere, the key instrument in creating structural elements in 
the stand management is leaving retention trees permanently standing at the final 
harvest.1  
 
The notion of green tree retention is of relatively young origin, dating back to the 
1990’s. It represents a forest management method in boreal forests that is more 
capable of sustaining biodiversity than conventional clear-cutting. Green tree retention 
refers to tall, old trees left permanently unharvested in commercial forests. It attempts 
to mimic natural disturbance regimes in commercial boreal forests. Leaving retention 
trees has three general objectives. It aims at “lifeboating” species and processes over 
the forest regeneration phase; it increases structural variation in the stand by creating 
                                                          
1 In Finland and Sweden leaving retention trees (5-10 tall, old trees per hectare) are recommended by 
national forest laws. Moreover, forest certification systems (FSC and FFCs) in these countries require 
the same. Some provinces in Canada have similar requirements, and similar plans exists in the U.S 
(for a survey, see Vanha-Majamaa and Jalonen 2001). 
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uneven-aged structures and the amount of dead wood; also it enhances connectivity on 
a landscape level (Franklin et al. 1997).  
 
Biodiversity maintenance by using green tree retention has recently been analyzed in 
an extended Hartman rotation model by Koskela et al. (2004). They show that private 
harvesting solutions, provided by the basic Faustmann or Hartman models, do not 
reflect the socially optimal solution for biodiversity maintenance. Private solutions 
entail too short rotation ages and no retention trees. In this paper we shift the focus on 
policies promoting green tree retention in boreal commercial private forestry. The 
research task is to find instruments or instrument combinations capable inducing the 
private landowners to manage biodiversity of their stands in a socially optimal manner. 
We focus on forest taxes/subsidies targeted to rotation age and on taxes/subsidies 
targeted to retention trees, and analyze the first-best policy design of alternative 
instrument combinations and assess their magnitudes in a numerical simulation–
optimization model calibrated for the Finnish forestry.  
 
We show analytically that a retention tree subsidy has to be used simultaneously and in 
synchrony with a corrective tax/subsidy targeted to the rotation age. The rate of the 
forest tax/subsidy depends on the level of the retention tree subsidy. We assess their 
magnitudes in a numerical simulation–optimization model calibrated for the Finnish 
forestry for a typical pine stand in Southern Finland. When combined with a timber 
subsidy or a site value tax, the size of the retention tree subsidy is about 1900 euros per 
ha both in the Faustmann and in the Hartman model. If combined with a harvest tax, 
the retention tree subsidy is 1000 and 750 euros in the Faustmann and Hartman model, 
respectively. The harvest tax rate varies over the range 40-60% in the Faustmann 
model and 20-40% in the Hartman model, while timber subsidy is between 0.5 – 1.0% 
and site value tax is about zero. While combinations where harvest tax is applied result 
in budget surplus, others lead to budget deficit.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we include retention trees 
with their associated benefits to the analysis of socially optimal choice of rotation 
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period and the volume of retention trees. Section 3 outlines the private harvesting 
solutions. Section 4 is devoted to the examination of the first-best instrument 
combinations to achieve the socially optimal outcome. In Section 5 we provide a 
numerical application for the case of Finnish forestry. Finally, a brief concluding 
section 6 ends the paper. 
 
2.  Biodiversity Management in Commercial Boreal Forests:  the 
Social Optimum   
 
In this section we incorporate biodiversity benefits from green tree retention into the 
Hartman model and define the socially optimal rotation age and volume of retention 
trees in commercial forests. Because we are analyzing optimal tax policy design, we 
concentrate on the steady-state analysis and to omit the case of the initial stand. 
 
In the steady-state, the social planner starts with bare (harvested) land, which contains 
a given volume of retention trees G , and plants new trees. The becoming harvest 
volume as a function of rotation age is defined by the forest growth function )(Tf . Let 
p  denote timber price, r  real interest rate and c  regeneration costs, which we assume 
to be constant. We will denote by V  the present value of the timber production, 
defined as [ ] 1)1)()(( −−− −−−= rTrT ecGTfpeV .  
 
We assume that biodiversity benefits accrue both from the green tree retention and the 
stand itself. Benefits from of the stand can be thought to follow a path of conventional 
age-dependent pattern. Although the need for a more detailed analysis of the 
connections between biodiversity and green tree retention is acknowledged, the list of 
biodiversity benefits from retention trees includes many important features. Retention 
trees provide a steady flow of deciduous trees and dead wood, which are important for 
many species (especially many red-list beetles), but have been steadily decreasing in 
the forests (see Ehnström 2001). Retention trees promote understorey vegetation 
(especially vascular plants), provided that their volume is high enough. There is also 
evidence that retention trees actually promote lifeboating of species and processes and 
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is beneficial to species that are sensitive to forest management operations (Hazell and 
Gustafsson 1999).  
 
Equation (1) expresses biodiversity benefits as a sum of the benefits accruing from the 
age of the whole stand becoming harvested, and benefits from the retention trees, 
which reach their biological maturity and decay during the next rotation period.   
 
∫ ∫ −− +=+= T T
T
rxrx dxeGxBdxexFGTvTaBB
0
2
),()(),()( .    (1) 
 
The first term, ∫ −=
T
rxdxexFTa
0
)()( , is conventional amenity with 0)( >′ TF , but is 
here applied to biodiversity.2 The second term ∫ −= T
T
rxdxeGxBGTv
2
),(),(  describes the 
biodiversity benefits from retention trees, chosen during the current rotation period and 
accruing during the next rotation period. Reflecting the long rotation periods in 
Northern boreal forests, the time between T  and T2  is assumed to be long enough for 
the retention trees to decay to a point where they provide biodiversity benefits but their 
land area can, nevertheless, be replanted. We make the following assumptions 
concerning biodiversity benefits 
 
[ ] 0),(),2(),,(ˆ >−≡= −− GTBeGTBerGTBv rTrTT    (2a) 
0),,(ˆ <= rGTBv TTT        (2b) 
0),(
2
>= ∫ −
T
T
rx
GG dxeGxBv ; 0),(
2
<= ∫ −
T
T
rx
GGGG dxeGxBv   (2c) 
[ ] 0),(),2( >−== −− GTBeGTBevv GrTGrTGTTG ,               (2d) 
 
where [ ])),()),2(),2((2ˆ GTBGTrBGTBeeB TTrTrTT −−= −−   
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Interpretation goes as follows. Marginal biodiversity benefit in (2a) is defined as a 
positive difference in diversity value of green retention between the beginning and the 
end of the second rotation period. Assumptions in (2a) and (2b) imply that the age of 
retention trees has decreasing marginal biodiversity benefits. The same is assumed to 
hold true for marginal benefits from the volume of green tree retention, G  by (2c). 
Finally, the cross-derivative in (2d) indicates that increasing the number (volume) of 
standing trees increases the marginal utility derived over time from these trees.  
 
The social planner’s economic problem is now to choose rotation age T and the 
volume of retention trees G so as to maximize  
 
[ ] 1
2
0
)1(),()()( −−−−− −


++−−= ∫∫ rTT
T
rx
T
rxrT edxeGxBdxexFcGTfpeSW .  (3) 
 
The first-order conditions for this problem read as 
 
0),(
2
=+−= ∫ −− T
T
rx
G
rT
G dxeGxBpeSW       (4a) 
[ ] 0),(),2()()()( =−−++−−′= − rSWGTBeGTBTFGTfrpTfpSW rTT  (4b) 
 
From equation (4a), the optimal volume of retention trees is chosen so as to equate the 
present value of the marginal loss of the harvest revenue with the present value of sum 
of the marginal utility of retention trees over their whole decaying process. According 
to (4b), the optimal rotation age is chosen so that marginal return of delaying the 
harvest by one unit of time equals the opportunity cost of delaying the harvesting. 
While the former is defined by the sum of the harvest revenue and biodiversity 
benefits during the first and the second rotation period, the latter includes the interest 
cost on standing timber and on land.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
2 In what follows, derivatives of a function with one argument are denoted with primes, while 
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The second-order conditions hold and are expressed as  
 
0)),(
2
<∫= −
T
T
rx
GGGG dxeGxBSW                 (5a) 
[ ] 0),,(ˆ)()()( <+′+′−′′= − rGTBTFTfrpTfpeSW TrTTT    (5b) 
 
02 >−= TGTTGG SWSWSWD ,       (5c) 
 
We ask next: How does the privately optimal harvesting behavior relate to the social 
optimum?  
 
3. Private Landowners and Biodiversity Externalities 
  
How do private landowners value forest amenities? Traditionally, two hypotheses have 
been presented and used. The most common assumption is that the landowner 
maximizes the present value of harvest revenue from timber production over infinite 
series of rotation. In this case the landowner behaves as described in the Faustmann 
rotation model. An alternative approach - which lies in conformity with some indirect 
empirical evidence (see e.g. Binkley 1981 and Kuuluvainen et al. 1996)  -  is to assume 
that the landowner maximizes the present value of the sum of harvest revenue and 
amenity services over infinite time horizon, behaving thus like the landowner in the 
Hartman model.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, we ask: is there evidence on a possibility that the 
landowners value biodiversity in their own forest? Unfortunately, there are no 
empirical studies concerning this issue. While the landowners may sometimes put 
value on some species or land areas, it is plausible to think that typically they do not 
take into account the whole spectrum of biodiversity. This is especially true when the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
partial derivatives of functions with more than one argument are denoted by subscripts. 
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stands are interdependent (see Amacher et al. 2004), but most likely it holds also for 
case of a single stand. Given these considerations we will focus on both basic types of 
landowner preferences in this section. Thus, the landowner is assumed to behave either 
in the Faustmannian or Hartmanian way.   
 
When the landowner follows Faustmann model, he maximizes the following present 
value of harvest revenue from timber production over infinite cycles of rotation  
 
1)1)()(( −−− −−= rTrT ecTfpeV       (13) 
 
The solution to this problem is well-known (see, for instance, Johansson and Löfgren 
1985). The following first-order condition characterizes the private rotation age: 
0)()( =−−′= rVTrpfTfpVT . The Faustmann behavior produces a solution pair 
{ }FF GT , , for which it holds that 0=FG . Therefore, we have ∗< TT F  and ∗< GG F , 
where the variables with asterisk refer to the socially optimal choices by (4a) and (4b).  
 
Under the Hartman behavior, the landowner maximizes the present value of the sum of 
harvest revenue and amenity services over infinite time horizon (Hartman 1976 and 
Strang 1983). To distinguish the private valuation of amenity services from 
biodiversity benefits, we denote the landowner’s amenity valuation by )(xA . This 
valuation may relate to biodiversity or to some other types of amenities. Hence, the 
objective function is given by 
 
1
0
)1)()()(( −−−− −+−= ∫ rTT rxrT edxexAceTpfW .    (14) 
 
The first-order condition, 0)()()( =−+−′= rWTATrpfTfpWT , implicitly defines 
the solution pair { }HH GT , , for which it holds that 0=HG . Therefore, also in the 
Hartman framework we have that *GG H <  and, if the landowner values young stands, 
we also have that *TT H < . However, if the landowner values old stands the Hartman 
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rotation age may be longer or shorter than the biodiversity benefits based rotation age 
depending on how biodiversity (age) valuation function )(TF and the private amenity 
valuation function )(TA relate to each other. For the purposes of the tax design we will 
denote by K  the present value of private amenity benefits, i.e, 
1
0
)1()( −−− −= ∫ rTT rx edxexAK . 
 
Both solutions fail to achieve the socially optimal rotation age and the socially optimal 
volume of retention trees. Thus, an externality is created. What does the internalization 
of this externality require? Under perfect information and in the first-best case, having 
two targets (rotation age, retention trees) requires two instruments (see Tinbergen 
1952). Generally, the government should punish the landowners for a too short private 
rotation age in the way that lengthens it, and it should bribe them to provide an 
incentive for the landowners to leave retention trees.3 Thus, a subsidy is needed to 
retention trees. As for the rotation age, we have many alternatives among forest taxes 
affecting the rotation age, thoroughly studied in the previous literature (see e.g. 
Johansson and Löfgren 1985 and Koskela and Ollikainen 2001). We present their 
comparative statics effects on the rotation age in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Comparative statics of forest taxation 
 
 
Forest tax Faustmann 
Model 
Hartman 
Model 
Harvest tax (x=t,τ) 0>FxT  0>
H
xT ,     as 0)(' >TF  
Site prod. tax, l 0=FlT  0=
H
lT  
Site value tax, β 0=FTβ  0>HTβ ,     as 0)(' >TF  
Timber tax, α 0<FTα  0<
HTα  
Profit tax θ 0=FaT  0>HTθ ,    as 0)(' >TF  
 
                                                          
3   For a general discussion of the incentive effects of punishing and subsidizing instruments in 
the case of biodiversity and habitat conservation, see e.g. Innes et al. (1998).  
 9
 
From Table 1, taxes affecting the rotation age include a yield tax (τ ) (levied on the 
harvest revenue), a unit tax (t) (called sometimes a severance tax and levied on the 
volume of harvested timber) and timber tax (α ) (levied on the value of growing 
stand). Property taxes (the site value tax, β , and the site productivity tax, l), and the 
profit tax (θ ) are neutral. Therefore, they cannot be used to change the privately 
optimal rotation period.4 
 
4. Optimal First-Best Instrument Combinations for Biodiversity  
 
We now design formally the optimal combination of punishing and encouraging 
Pigouvian instruments and study how they affect the private landowners behavior by 
using an approach outlined in a different forestry context by Englin and Klan (1990).5 
We start with the case of harvest revenue maximizer a’la Faustmann, and levy subsidy 
and tax instruments on the landowner, equating the resulting private first-order 
conditions with the socially optimal choices and solving this for socially optimal 
instrument rates. 
  
Thus, we can design three instrument combinations: retention tree subsidy can be used 
jointly with yield (or unit) tax, timber subsidy or with site value (profit) tax. The two 
former combinations apply to both Faustmann and Hartman landowners. The last 
combination, however, can be used only in the case of Hartman landowner, because it 
causes no rotation effects in the Faustmann framework.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Only the site productivity tax and the timber tax have qualitatively similar effects in both 
models. Note that the effects of site value tax and the profit tax, as well as those of harvest 
taxes, may have positive or negative effects depending on the nature of marginal amenity 
valuation. Here we report only those signs relevant to biodiversity maintenance. 
5 Note that we study this issue in the absence of government budget constraint. Allowing for a 
government revenue requirement in the presence of distortionary taxes or subsidies would 
modify results. For an application of the second best analysis in the Hartman framework with 
binding government budget constraint, see Koskela and Ollikainen (2003).    
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A. A combination of retention tree subsidy and yield tax 
 
Under a combination of the yield tax and retention tree subsidy, the objective function 
of the private landowner in the Faustmann framework reads as 
[ ] 1)1)()()(( −−−−∗ −−+−= rTrTrT eceGsGTfepV , where )1(* τ−= pp  and )(Gs  
describes a non-linear retention tree subsidy. Choosing T and G optimally yields the 
following first-order conditions for the private landowner 
 
0)( =′+−= ∗ GspVG                            (15a) 
[ ] 0)()()( =−−−−′= ∗∗ rVGrsGTfrpTfpVT     (15b) 
 
According to (15a), it is optimal to increase the volume of retention trees up to the 
point, where the marginal subsidy from doing so ( )(' Gs ) is equal to the harvest 
revenue lost, defined by the after-tax timber price ( ∗p ). Condition (15b), defining 
optimal rotation age as a function of the yield tax, is well-known and evident. 
 
In the case of the Hartman landowner, the objective function, W, reads as 
 
[ ] 1
0
)1()()()( −−−−−∗ −


+−+−= ∫ rTT rxrTrT edxexAceGsGTfepW . 
 
We assume that the landowner’s preferences to amenities (the last term in brackets) are 
identical to those of the society. The first-order conditions for the privately optimal 
choice in the presence of this instrument combination are  
 
0)( =′+−= ∗ GspWG        (16a) 
[ ] 0)()()()( =−−+−−′= ∗∗ rWGrsTAGTfrpTfpWT .   (16b) 
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Setting next (15a) equal to (4a) and (15b) equal to (4b) and solving them for optimal 
)(Gs′  and τ yields for in the Faustmann case 
 
∫−=′ −∗∗
T
T
rx
G
rT
FF dxeGxBeGs
2
),()1()( τ       (17a) 
[ ]
[ ]))(()(
)),,(ˆ())(()(
GTfrTfp
rHrGTBrETFGrs
F
−−
′
−+−+
−=
∗
η
η
τ     (17b) 
 
where 1)1( −−−= rTeη , ),,(ˆ rGTB  is defined in (2a), ∫−= −−−
T
rxrT dxexFeE
0
1 )()1( , and 
∫ −−−−= T
T
rxrT dxeGxBeH
2
1 ),()1( . In (17b) the denominator is negative due to the first-
order condition of for the social optimum (7b). It can be shown that according to (17b), 
the optimal yield tax rate is positive but less than one, given that older stands yield 
higher biodiversity benefits, and it depends on timber price, interest rate and marginal 
amenity benefits as well as on the subsidy rate.6 From (17a) we can see that the shape 
of marginal subsidy to retention trees follows the decreasing social marginal 
biodiversity benefits from retention trees. Because the positive yield tax will lengthen 
the rotation age, the marginal subsidy is adjusted to the yield tax rate. Thus, we can 
also conclude that the levels of both instruments should be synchronized in the first-
best situation. Finally, note that (17a) defines the optimal marginal rate of the subsidy, 
not its general level. Hence, there is some freedom of choosing the total subsidy. 
 
In the similar way as above, we obtain by comparing the conditions governing the 
privately optimal solution with the socially optimal first-order conditions (16a to 4a 
and 16b to 4b): 
 
                                                          
6 Similar result holds for the unit tax as well. Proof is available upon request. This is due to the 
fact the timber price is given for the representative landowner. If timber markets were 
imperfectly competitive, the situation would be different. Then the effects of yield and unit 
taxes are not qualitatively similar. See e.g. Anderson and de Palma and Kreider (2001) and 
Delipallah and Keen (1992). 
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  ∫−=′ −∗∗
T
T
rx
G
rT
HH dxeGxBeGs
2
),()1()( τ       (18a) 
[ ]
[ ]))(()(
)),,(ˆ()(
GTfrTfp
rHrGTBGrs
H
−−
′
Ω+−+
−=
∗
η
η
τ ,     (18b) 
 
where 0)())(())(( <≥−−−=Ω rKTArETF  is the difference between the social 
biodiversity benefit valuation and private amenity valuation. In most cases it is 
plausible to think that Ω  is positive. However, in some cases it is possible that Ω  is 
negative indicating that the private valuation of amenity benefits is higher than the 
age-related biodiversity valuation. However, this would not change the sign of 
numerator in (18a), because benefits from retention trees plausibly dominate Ω  in this 
case. Naturally, higher difference between social biodiversity benefit valuation and 
private amenity valuation gives rise to higher optimal yield tax, and vice versa. 
 
Economic interpretation of (18a) and (18b) is then as follows. Because the 
denominator in (18b) is negative due to the first-order condition of social optimum 
(4b) but numerator is positive, we see that the optimal yield tax rate is positive and 
depends on timber price, interest rate and marginal amenity benefits as well as on the 
subsidy rate. Relative to the case, where private landowners follow Faustmann 
behavior, the optimal yield tax in (18b) is smaller, because when older stands are 
preferred the Hartman rotation age is longer than the Faustmann rotation age. (This 
can be seen by noting that now the numerator is smaller than in Faustmann case). 
Moreover, according to equation (18a), the marginal subsidy to retention trees is 
higher than in the Faustmann case. This is because the after tax timber price and the 
opportunity cost of retention trees are higher. Like in the Faustmann case, we can find 
that the levels of both instruments depend on each other and should be designed in a 
synchrony.7 
 
 
                                                          
7 Also in the Hartman case we can show that the result for the unit tax is qualitatively similar 
as the respective results for the yield tax. 
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B. A combination of retention tree subsidy and a timber tax 
 
If society uses a timber tax instead of harvesting taxes the objective function of the 
private landowner is 1
0
)1()()())(( −−−−− −


−−+−= ∫ rTT rsrTrT ecdsespfeGsGTfpeV α . 
The respective first-order conditions for the private optimum are 
 
0)( =′+−= GspVG         (19a) 
[ ] [ ] 0)()()()( =−−−−−−′= rVrUTpfGrsGTfrpTfpVT α ,  (19b) 
 
where ∫−= −−−
T
rsrT dsespfeU
0
1 )()1( and 0))(( >− rUTpf  (see Koskela and Ollikainen 
2001a). Interpretation of (19a) is similar to previous case with the exception that now 
timber price is untaxed. Condition (19b) defines the optimal rotation period as a 
function of timber tax α . 
 
In the Hartman case, the landowner’s objective function reads as 
 
1
00
)1()()()())(( −−−−−− −


+−−+−= ∫∫ rTT rxT rsrTrT edxexAdsespfceGsGTfpeW α  
 
The optimal choice of rotation age and the volume of retention trees is characterized 
by 
 
0)( =′+−= GspWG         (20a) 
[ ] 0))(()()()()( =−−−−+−−′= rWrUTpfGrsTAGTfrpTfpWT α        (20b) 
 
They define the retention trees and rotation age as a function of the instrument 
combination. 
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Equalizing, again, the private Faustmann and social solutions (4a to 19a, and 4b to 
19b) gives the optimal )(Gs′  and α  
 
∫=′ −∗
T
T
rx
G
rT
F dxeGxBeGs
2
),()(        (21a) 
[ ]
rUTpf
rHrGTBrETFGs
F
−
−+−+
−=
∗
)(
)),,(ˆ())(()(η
α     (21b) 
 
From (21a), the marginal subsidy to retention trees decreases in G , which follows 
from the decreasing social marginal biodiversity benefits from reserved trees. This 
subsidy is independent of the timber tax, because it does not distort timber price, 
which determines the opportunity cost of leaving retention trees. In (21b) both 
numerator and denominator are positive, so that we have a timber subsidy instead of 
timber tax. This makes sense, because from Table 1 we know that timber tax shortens 
but timber subsidy lengthens the rotation age. The optimal timber subsidy depends on 
the present value of the retention tree subsidy. Its optimal size reflects the ratio of the 
net marginal biodiversity benefits (over their opportunity costs terms), and of the effect 
of the timber subsidy for timber production. 
 
Finally, we obtain by equating (20a) to (4a) and (20b) to (4b) the following optimal 
first-best design in the Hartman case 
 
∫=′ −∗
T
T
rx
G
rT
H dxeGxBeGs
2
),()(        (22a) 
[ ]
rUTpf
rHrGTBGs
H
−
Ω+−+
−=
∗
)(
),,(ˆ)(η
α .     (22b) 
 
where 0)())(())(( <≥−−−=Ω rKTArETF  is the difference between the social 
biodiversity benefit valuation and private amenity valuation. From (22a) we can see 
that the marginal subsidy to retention trees is similar as in the Faustmann case and 
independent of the timber subsidy with a similar interpretation. In fact, the optimal 
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marginal subsidy rate is the same as in the Faustmann case. The reason is obvious. In 
both cases there are no incentives to leave retention trees. As for the timber subsidy, 
*α , the whole expression is plausibly negative. The denominator is now smaller than 
under Faustmann model reflecting the landowner’s amenity valuation and thus the 
smaller size of externality caused by private harvesting. Finally, again, the timber 
subsidy rate is independent on the retention tree subsidy. Like in the earlier case, 
higher difference between social biodiversity benefit valuation and private amenity 
valuation gives rise to higher optimal timber subsidy, ceteris paribus. 
  
C. A combination of retention tree subsidy and a site value tax 
 
Finally, suppose that now the government uses a combination of tree retention subsidy 
and the site value tax, ,β  (or the profit tax, θ , which is equivalent to the site value tax, 
see Koskela and Ollikainen 2001a for the proof). The site value tax is levied on the 
value of land, and the profit tax on net harvest revenue, which coincide. Thus, the 
private landowner in the Hartman framework has the following objective function 
 
[ ] 1
0
)1()()())(()1( −−−−− −


+−+−−= ∫ rT
T
rxrTrT edxexAceGsGTfpeW β , 
 
where we assume that also the retention tree subsidy is subject to the tax as it increases 
the value of the forestland. 
 
The first-order conditions for the privately optimal choice of retention trees and 
rotation age are 
 
0)(0 =′+−⇔= GspWG                   (23a) 
[ ] 0)()())(()()1( =−+−−−−′−= rKAFrVGrsGTfrpTfpWT β . (23b) 
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From (23a), the site value tax does not matter for the choice of retention trees, so that 
the volume of green tree retention is determined by equality of timber price and the 
marginal rate of retention tree subsidy. The optimal condition for the rotation age is 
conventional and here the site value tax matters, because it changes relative benefits of 
harvesting revenue and amenity valuation. 
 
By comparing these privately optimal conditions (23a) and (23b) with the socially 
optimal (4a) and (4b) yields 
 
∫ −∗ =′
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2
),()(             (24a) 
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Thus, the marginal retention tree subsidy is similar as in (21a) and (22b) and 
independent of the level of site value tax. The optimal site value tax is positive, 
because, under our assumptions the numerator is negative due to the first-order 
conditions, but the denominator is positive. The optimal site value tax reflects the net 
marginal biodiversity benefits relative to net harvest revenue. Moreover, higher 
difference between social biodiversity benefit valuation and private amenity valuation, 
defined by ,Ω  gives rise to higher optimal site value tax, ceteris paribus. Finally, one 
can be shown that the same outcome holds for the combination of retention tree 
subsidy and profit tax (see Koskela and Ollikainen 2001a). 
 
5. An Empirical Application to Finnish Forestry 
 
We now illustrate our model by using a complex numerical simulation–optimization 
model developed for Finnish Forestry. First, we describe the model and drawing on 
Finnish empirical studies develop our estimates of biodiversity valuation. We then 
assess empirically the length of the rotation period and the volume of retention trees in 
the Faustmann, Hartman and our biodiversity model. Drawing on these we then define 
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the optimal instrument combinations capable of adjusting the Faustmannian and the 
Hartmanian landowner to behave in the socially optimal way. 
 
5.1 The numerical simulation – optimization system 
 
A simulation – optimization system was developed for numerical optimization of the 
rotation length and amount of retention trees. The simulation system calculates the 
value of the objective function with the combination of our decision variables, while 
the optimization system gradually modifies the values of decision variables based on 
the feedback from the simulation system, and eventually finds the optimal rotation 
length and volume of retention trees. The algorithm developed by Hooke and Jeeves, 
and adopted from Osyczka (1984), for non-linear derivative-free optimization was 
used (see Pukkala and Miina 1997 for more details). 
 
Simulation of stand development is based on individual trees. The simulation begins 
with bare land with no retention trees and no deadwood. The stand establishment is 
predicted with the models of Miina and Saksa (2004). The models predict the number 
of surviving planted trees per hectare, as well as the amount of naturally regenerated 
pine, spruce, birch, and hardwood coppice. Stand development is simulated in 5-year 
time steps. Various Finnish models are used to predict the juvenile height growths and 
diameters of seedlings from the seedling stage to the sapling stage (dbh 5 cm), after 
which the individual-tree growth models of Nyyssönen and Mielikäinen (1971) are 
used. A tending treatment is simulated at a stand age of 5 to 20 years (depending on 
site and planted tree species). It removes all coppices and regulates the frequencies of 
other trees. The stand establishment and tending costs, used in the simulator, are based 
on cost statistics. 
 
The self-thinning models of Pukkala and Miina (1997) are used to calculate the 
maximum stand density for a given mean tree diameter. Mortality occurs when this 
limit is passed, creating one or several cohorts of standing deadwood (snags). During a 
time step, a part of a snag cohort forms a down-wood cohort, its relative frequency 
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being equal to the probability of falling down. Both snag and down-wood cohorts 
decompose with time, the decomposition rate being clearly higher for down-wood than 
for snags. 
 
Stand development is simulated until the rotation age is reached, after which a final cut 
is simulated. Retention trees may be left to continue growing, depending on the current 
input value of the retention tree parameter. The roadside value of the removed volume 
(gross income) is calculated using user-supplied unit prices of different timber 
assortments. The assortment volumes are calculated using the taper functions of 
Laasasenaho (1982). The harvesting cost is calculated with the models of Valsta 
(1992).  
 
Simulation is continued for three additional rotations, keeping the deadwood cohorts 
and retention trees of the previous rotation(s). The simulation is otherwise similar as 
during the first rotation except that there are now initial retention tree cohorts and 
initial deadwood. The growth of retention trees is simulated using the growth models 
of Nyyssönen and Mielikäinen (1971). A part of a retention tree cohort is wind-thrown 
and another part may die of senescence during a time step, the relative frequencies of 
these new cohorts depending on the probabilities of these events. Dead retention tree 
cohorts decompose with the same rate as the other deadwood cohorts. A standing 
deadwood cohort originating from a retention tree cohort falls down with the same 
probability as other snags. 
 
Retention trees are assumed to reduce the growing space that is available to the other 
trees: their effect to the other growing stand is simulated through an area multiplier. 
The share of growing space taken by retention trees is equal to the ratio of the basal 
area of retention trees to the maximum stand basal area that the site can sustain. If the 
basal area of retention trees decreases due to mortality, the growing space available to 
other trees increases creating accelerated growth. It is assumed that the other trees can 
fully utilize the growing space left by dead retention trees. This kind of simulation is 
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reasonable when retention trees occur in dense and small groups, which is the current 
practice. 
 
In addition to costs and incomes, the simulator calculates a biodiversity index for the 
stand at every time point. The biodiversity index is as a weighted sum of scaled values 
of various structural elements present in the stand. The structural elements are: 
volumes of different tree species, volumes 10-cm diameter classes, and volumes 
deadwood components (standing deadwood and down-wood of different tree species). 
Each element increases the index fast up to certain level (“satisfactory amount”) after 
which its additional contribution becomes very small.  
 
The monetary value (Єha-1a-1) of the maximum biodiversity index is a user-supplied 
parameter. We used Finnish estimates for valuation of biodiversity conservation as a 
part of normal practices in commercial forestry. A contingent valuation study by 
Rekola and Pouta (1999) suggests that the mean of WTP for an increase of retention 
trees from current 15 to 30 would be 40 euros. We calibrate our quadratic biodiversity 
valuation function to reflect this estimate as follows. The value (VALBD) of 
biodiversity index was calculated from equation VALBD = WTPBD (BD/BDmax), where 
WTPBD is the value of the maximum biodiversity index  (BDmax) of the stand.  
 
This estimate will be used in two alternative versions of biodiversity model. In 
BIODIV I the society values only biodiversity benefits and in BIODIV II it values also 
other amenities in addition to biodiversity. In this study we interpret that other 
amenities refer to recreation, because for it there are empirical estimates available. The 
simulator calculates a recreation index for the stand using the empirical models of 
Pukkala et al. (1988). Relying on Finnish studies we use the following estimates 
Rekola and Pouta (1999), focusing explicitly on retention trees, suggests that as the 
maximum value of the biodiversity index equals 40 euros/ha (WTPBD), and for the 
amenity benefits we refer to Kniivilä et al. (2002) and set the value of maximal 
recreational index to 50 euros/ha (WTPA). The monetary value of the amenities 
(recreation) of a stand is calculated from VALA = WTPA(RI/RImax) where RI is the 
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recreation index of the stand and RImax is the highest possible value of the recreation 
index. 
 
The objective function value was calculated from the last (fourth) simulated rotation, 
which was assumed to be repeated to the infinity. The other rotations were used to 
initialize the steady-state amounts of deadwood and retention tree cohorts, present in 
the beginning of the last rotation. Next we report the simulation results. 
 
5.2 Simulation Results 
 
Our results are solved for pine under typical growth conditions in Southern Finland 
without thinning treatment. We first solved the privately and socially optimal solution, 
which provide the benchmarks for levying the instruments. Then instrument 
combinations were solved for. We present our results in the same order. 
 
A. Benchmark Rotation Ages and Retention Tree Volumes 
 
In Table 2 we report four models in terms of rotation ages, retention volumes and 
resulting harvests and economic benefits. The first two are the Faustmann and the 
Hartman for private landowners. The last two are our biodiversity models: in BIODIV 
I the society values only biodiversity benefits and in BIODIV II also other amenities in 
addition to biodiversity benefits. In all models we use the value of 0.03 as the real 
interest rate.  
 
 Table 2. The privately and socially optimal rotation ages:  Faustmann, Hartman, and 
 Biodiversity models 
 
 
 Faustmann
Private 
Hartman 
    Private 
BIODIV I 
Social 
BIODIV II 
Social 
Rotation Age 60 66 64 67 
Retention m3/ha 0 0 7.7 7.9 
Mean annual harvest 4.20 4.42 4.17 4.08 
Mean annual net income 152 171 157 159 
Timber benefit 1013 1026 952 873 
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Amenity benefit 0 518 0 524 
Biodiversity benefit 0 0 250 320 
Total benefit (SEV) 1013 1544 1202 1717 
 
 
 
From Table 2, the rotation ages range from 60 to 67 increasing from private solutions 
to the socially optimal biodiversity solution. In our example, the private amenity 
valuation leads to a slightly longer rotation age than BIODV I, but shorter than 
BIODIV II. The reason to this outcome is that we employ the 50 €/ha valuation from 
studies mentioned above and it exceeds the willingness to pay for biodiversity, 40 € 
found in previously mentioned studies. All rotation ages are rather short relative to 
current Finnish forestry practice. The main reason for this is that, following our 
theoretical models, we omit commercial thinning, which naturally tends to postpone 
the optimal age for final felling (see e.g. Pukkala et al. 1998). In Appendix 1 we 
demonstrate that differences between rotation ages increase considerably for lower 
values of the real interest rate. Under our forest growth function, the mean annual 
harvest ranges between 4.08 – 4.42. Thus, biodiversity conservation does not imply 
any major decrease in timber supply.  
 
Naturally, the volume of retention tree is zero in Faustmann and Hartman models. In 
the BIODIV I and II models, the amount of retention trees is positive, being about 8 
m3/ha. Because the stand volume at final felling is about 300 m3/ha, this means that 
2.7% of wood biomass is left in the stand as small groups of trees. Biodiversity 
benefits account for about 25% of timber benefits.  
 
B. Optimal instrument combinations 
 
When calculating the optimal instrument combinations we used the retention volume 
and rotation age of BIODIV II model as our targets.8 The retention tree subsidy 
                                                          
8  Note that adopting BIODIV I model would have slightly changed the results obtained here. 
As private rotation age is longer than the socially optimal one, the harvest tax rate would 
become a harvest subsidy and timber subsidy would be a tax. 
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function was approximated by 3.05.0 Gs = . Thus, it has a concave shape providing 
decreasing marginal subsidy, as the theoretical model requires. We had no a priori 
information for the shape parameters, and they were chosen for convenience, Figure 1 
illustrates its shape. 
 
Figure 1. The shape of the retention tree subsidy function  
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We collect the all five possible set of instrument combinations in Table 3 and illustrate 
part of the search processes in Figures 1 – 5 in Appendix 2. Notation in Table 3 is just 
like before, thus s  denotes retention tree subsidy, τ harvest tax, α timber tax and 
β site value tax (we showed in the theoretical model that yield and unit taxes behave 
in a similar manner, thus we here focus solely on the yield tax).  
 
 
Table 3. Optimal first-best subsidy and tax instrument combinations. 
 
Combination Faustmann Hartman 
s & τ s = 1000 τ  =  40 - 65 % s = 750 τ  = 20 – 40 % 
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s & α s = 1500-2500 α = - 1% s = 1900 α = - 0.5% 
s & β -- -- s = 1700 β = 0 % 
 
Theoretical analysis suggested that the retention tree subsidy and harvest tax rates will 
differ between the Faustmann and Hartman models in the instrument combination (s & 
τ). Table 3 clearly exhibits this feature. Due to discontinuities in the simulation model 
(flat response surface with several local optima), the harvest tax rates are not uniquely 
defined, however, but are defined by a range. From our theoretical framework we 
know that the harvest tax rate should be higher in the Faustman model than in the 
Harman model, and Table 3 verifies this empirically. The retention tree subsidy is 
higher for the Faustmann model (recall we had higher marginal subsidy for the 
Hartman model, which implies lower overall subsidy in this model under a concave 
subsidy function).  Interestingly, for the Hartman model we obtain a harvest tax rate 
range into which the actually applied Finnish yield tax rate, 29%, fits. For the 
Faustmann model the optimal harvest tax rate clearly exceeds the current Finnish yield 
tax.  
 
Our theoretical analysis revealed that the retention tree subsidies should be equal in 
Faustmann and Hartman models in the combination (s & α), because retention tree 
subsidy was independent of timber subsidy. We can ascertain this to happen in Table 
3. The minus marks in the third and fifth columns of this combination (third row) 
demonstrate that, indeed, we have a timber subsidy. The second column in turn shows 
the range of retention tree subsidy in the Faustmann model. This range has a mean 
almost identical to retention tree subsidy in the Hartman model, just as the theoretical 
analysis required. 
 
The final instrument combination, a retention tree subsidy with the site value tax, is 
reported for the Harman model in the last row of Table 3. The site value tax was 
modeled by charging it in the initial planting year. It turned out that site value tax was 
not required to have the Hartmannian private optimum nearly similar with the social 
optimum. However, the private optimum had a rotation length one year shorter than 
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the social optimum, which means that a very small site value tax would in fact be the 
correct instrument level. Recall that theoretical model predicts the same retention tree 
subsidy as in the previous case. Due to discontinuities of the simulation model and 
inaccuracies in numerical optimization, the retention tree subsidy is, however, slightly 
lower than in the previous case. 
 
C. Budget effects of the optimal design of instruments 
 
It is interesting to compare how our instrument combinations affect the government 
forestry budget. Even though we assume here the first-best instrument combinations, 
the budget burden of alternative instrument combinations is always important when 
these policy packages are compared with each other. These effects are collected in 
Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Budget effects of optimal instrument combinations 
 
Model and 
instruments 
Size of 
subsidy/ 
10 m3 
Tax rate Received 
subsidies 
€/ha 
Tax 
payment 
€/ha 
Budget 
burden 
F: subsidy (s) & 
harvest tax (τ) 
1000 60 916 8644 7728 (+) 
F: subsidy (s) & 
timber tax (α) 
2000 -1 1866 -496 2362 (-) 
H: subsidy & harvest 
tax (τ) 
750 30 689 4468 4298 (+) 
H: subsidy (s) & 
timber tax (α) 
1900 -0.5 1786 -248 1538 (-) 
H: subsidy & site 
value tax (β) 
1700 0 1490 0 1490 (-) 
 
 
Drawing on the optimal rates of subsidies and taxes we report the received subsidies 
and paid taxes over one rotation period in fourth and fifth columns. Their difference 
indicates both the private net support and the government budget burden and is 
reported in the sixth column. When the forestry budget exhibits surplus it is indicated 
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by (+) and budget deficit is denoted by (-). Clearly, with two exceptions, where harvest 
tax is applied, budget is in deficit. This deficit is largest for the combination (s & α) 
under Faustmann behavior and smallest for the combination (s & β) under Hartman 
behavior.  
 
Table 4 implies important lessons. First, different instrument combinations have 
different budget impacts. They depend on i) the characteristics of available forest taxes 
and on ii) the assumption concerning whether the private landowners have amenity 
valuation. Naturally, if the landowners behave in the Hartmanian way the budget 
burden will be lower than in the case of Faustmann behavior. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
We analyzed biodiversity conservation policies at the stand level for commercial 
boreal forests when retention trees are the key instrument in promoting habitat and 
species diversity. We solved first the socially optimal rotation age and the volume of 
retention trees, and compared them with the private solution when the landowner 
behaves according to either Faustmann or (the basic) Hartman model. In the first best 
solution, two instruments are needed – one to promote leaving retention trees and 
another to lengthen the privately optimal rotation age. 
 
Our special focus was in designing the optimal instrument combinations. We 
demonstrated that a fully synchronized combination of retention tree subsidy and tax 
instruments is needed to induce the landowner to lengthen the privately optimal 
rotation period and to provide an incentive to leave retention trees. A retention tree 
subsidy reflects the marginal biodiversity benefits from retention trees. We show that a 
retention tree subsidy has to be used simultaneously and in synchrony with a corrective 
tax/subsidy targeted to the rotation age. 
 
By using a simulation model for Finnish forestry, we assessed empirically the rotation 
ages and retention tree volumes in the Faustmann, Hartman and biodiversity models. 
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The rate of the forest tax/subsidy depends on the level of the retention tree subsidy. 
When combined with a timber subsidy or a site value tax, the size of the retention tree 
subsidy is about 1700 - 2000 euros per ha both in the Faustmann and in the Hartman 
model. If combined with a harvest tax, the retention tree subsidy is 1000 and 750 euros 
in the Faustmann and Hartman model, respectively. The harvest tax rate varies over 
the range 40-60% in the Faustmann model and 20-40% in the Hartman model, while 
timber subsidy is 0.5 – 1.0% and site value tax is close to zero. While combinations 
where harvest tax is applied result in budget surplus, others lead to budget deficit.  
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Appendix 1. Sensitivity of optimal solutions to real interest rate 
 
 Table 1. Sensitivity of optimal solutions: r = 2% 
 
 
 Faustmann
Private 
Hartman 
    Private 
BIODIV I 
Social 
BIODIV II 
Social 
Rotation Age 66 66 71 71 
Retention m3/ha 0 0 9.0 9.0 
Mean annual harvest 4.42 4.41 4.27 4.27 
Mean annual net income 172 167 169 169 
Timber benefit 3355 3230 3066 3066 
Amenity benefit 0 892 0 971 
Biodiversity benefit 0 0 621 621 
Total benefit (SEV) 3355 4122 3687 4658 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sensitivity of optimal solutions: r = 1% 
 
 
 Faustmann
Private 
Hartman 
    Private 
BIODIV I 
Social 
BIODIV II 
Social 
Rotation Age 71 76 75 101 
Retention m3/ha 0 0 9.8 7.9 
Mean annual harvest 4.42 4.41 4.25 4.20 
Mean annual net income 174 180 173 183 
Timber benefit 11148 11234 10815 9766 
Amenity benefit 0 2277 0 2928 
Biodiversity benefit 0 0 1675 2619 
Total benefit (SEV) 11148 13511 12490 15313 
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Appendix 2. Numerical illustrations of optimal instrument combinations. 
 
Figure 1.  Harvest tax and subsidy in the Faustmann model 
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Figure 2. Timber tax and subsidy 
 
Timber tax = -1 %
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Subsidy, €/ha for 10 m3
Pe
rc
en
t o
f s
oc
ia
l o
pt
im
um
Rotation
Retention
Target
 
 
 
 
 
 31
Figure 3. Harvest tax + subsidy in the Hartman model 
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Figure 4.  Timber tax and subsidy in the Hartman 
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Figure 5.  Site value tax and subsidy in the Hartman model 
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